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Bernardo Sepdlveda'
Institute for Transnational Arbitration
The changes that have taken place in arbitration conditions, the greater fair-
ness in the arbitration process, and the increasingly stringent qualifications to be
met by arbitrators, as well as contemporary economic realities, have been in-
strumental in causing Mexico's about-face on its approach to arbitration.
In 1994, when the North America Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") came
into effect, the doors were opened for the implementation by Mexico of various
mechanisms to settle trade and investment disputes, and arbitration became the
accepted dispute settlement formula.
This first political decision of the Mexican government was followed by the
signing of a good deal of bilateral and multilateral treaties aimed at luring the
flow of investment and trade to Mexico, relying on an arbitral process to handle
potential differences between foreign investors and Mexico.
The signing of agreements of this kind has significantly increased Mexico's
foreign trade, and enhanced the flow of foreign investment to Mexico. Between
1993 and 2003, Mexico's exports increased three-fold and its imports increased
160%.
Accumulated foreign investment jumped from 15 billion dollars in 1994 to
142 billion dollars in 2003. During the ten years preceding 1994, when NAFTA
came into force, the flow of foreign direct investment ["FDI"] averaged 3.47
billion dollars each year; in the ten years following 1994, it averaged 12.6 bil-
lion dollars each year.
The benefit of the arbitration clause has its limits: as the number of coun-
tries that enter into agreements to promote FDI increases, so does the competi-
tion to lure FDI flow. For example, Mexico's share of the 235.5 billion dollar
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FDI worldwide in 1994 was 4.9%; in 2004, its share of the 612 billion dollar
FDI worldwide flow was 2.9%.
In light of these figures, it is obvious that we're doing something wrong. If
a second generation of fundamental structural reforms is not introduced, we're
running the serious risk of suffering major setbacks in the field of competitive-
ness, technological progress, institutional development and governance, macro-
economic stability, and, even more serious, the well-being of a society still hin-
dered by deep-rooted inequalities in the distribution of wealth.
In the past decades, Mexican corporations have become exporters of capital,
and have achieved an outstanding presence in the United States and a good
number of countries in Latin America, the European Union and Asia.
Twenty multinational Mexican companies combined earn 17 billion dollars
in revenues from their foreign subsidiaries and have created fifty-five thousand
direct jobs overseas. CEMEX is the one Mexican corporate group with opera-
tions in five continents. Other companies enjoying a high degree of internation-
alization are Amdrica M6vil, Grupo Maseca, Grupo Bimbo, Femsa, ICA, Grupo
Posadas, Grupo Carso, Alfa, and Vitro.
The twenty major multinational Mexican companies, and others with a
somewhat lower profile, do business in a variety of jurisdictions. In some of
those jurisdictions there may be an investment treaty between Mexico and the
corresponding country, and such treaty may include an arbitration clause. How-
ever, no such treaty exists in a large number of jurisdictions.
In some jurisdictions, Mexican investors could be subject to arbitrary or
discriminatory government action that may, in an extreme case, lead to seizure
of their property. It is also likely that domestic courts do not always provide the
sufficient assurance that such investors' rights will be properly protected, espe-
cially if the adversary party in litigation is the host government. Such risks can
be cut short if Mexican investors have access to an international arbitration
mechanism that helps circumvent local gaps and legal voids.
However, when a dispute arises between a Mexican investor and the gov-
ernment of one of the 142 ICSID member states, such dispute cannot be settled
based on the Convention, as Mexico is not a contracting party to ICSID. In the
best scenario, the dispute may be settled through the ICSID Additional Facility
Rules, but only if a contracting state and Mexico have agreed to submit to thatjurisdiction in a bilateral investment treaty. This will not necessarily be the case
in all circumstances.
What all this amounts to is the following: a Mexican investor that exports
capital will find it most advantageous for Mexico to adhere to the ICSID Con-
vention because, in the event of a dispute with the host state, an investor will
have a greater assurance that the conciliation and arbitration proceedings af-
forded by ICSID are available.
Although in certain quarters doubts remain in Mexico as to the advantages
of international arbitration, it would be ill advised to ignore a legal and political
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reality. In signing treaties that include an arbitration clause, Mexico has as-
sumed rights and obligations. Politically speaking, a border has already been
crossed. In the face of this indisputable fact, the many benefits implicit in the
legal commitments already assumed by Mexico in the field of arbitration would
be strengthened by joining ICSID.
A critical issue is to determine whether the dispute resolution system af-
forded by ICSID is the legal framework that best serves the goals of Mexico,
which encompass a variety of elements, such as legal certainty, preventing con-
flicts with other states, promoting international law, and strengthening interna-
tional tribunals using the advantages provided by a global economic system, and
luring a greater flow of trade, investment, financing and technology to help na-
tional development.
One preliminary matter in this assessment is related to ICSID's legal char-
acter. The Convention is a treaty signed by states that confers certain rights,
imposes certain obligations, and sets a balance between the host state's and the
investors' interests. Pundits consider the institution created by the Convention
as "one of the most modem and sophisticated mechanisms in contemporary
international arbitration."
The Center, created on the basis of the Convention, is an international or-
ganization under the auspices of the World Bank; its arbitration process is sub-
ject to international law. It is an autonomous institution with its own legal ca-
pacity and its own legal rules, independent of domestic courts, and provides for
proceedings that allow, pursuant to certain previously established rules, chal-
lenges to arbitral awards through appeals.
Since the Convention is a treaty, any differences arising among contracting
states regarding its interpretation or application may be submitted to the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
The use of the Additional Facility Rules implies the exclusion of the Con-
vention, since it expressly states that "none of the provisions of the Convention
shall be applicable to the proceedings (to which the Additional Facility Rules
refer), or to recommendations, awards, or reports which may be rendered
therein." (Additional Facility Rules, Article 3). Being exempted from the ap-
plication of the Convention may turn out to be a disadvantage, as Mexico or one
of its investors will be prevented from resorting to the legal and institutional
framework afforded by the ICSID.
This means, for example, that the Convention rules regarding the recogni-
tion and enforcement of arbitration awards will not apply to awards issued under
the Additional Facility. In the context of the Additional Facility Rules, such
recognition and enforcement must follow a different set of regulations, as we
will see later on.
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3
Sep&uacute;lveda: Mexico and the Settlement of Investment Disputes: ICSID as the Re
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2005
The Convention has created a legal and institutional framework whose use-
fulness has been proven, with a Center that becomes an arbitration facilitator. It
has a roster of arbitrators, and a contracting state may appoint four persons to
the panel of arbitrators, a power not granted by the Additional Facility Rules.
If Mexico joins the Convention as a contracting party, it will be represented
in the Center's Board of Directors. As such, it will take part in the drafting of
the guidelines for the Center's operation, which includes the determination of
the rules applicable to arbitration. Some proposals are already on the floor to
enhance the Center's operation, which address issues that are certainly of inter-
est for Mexico.
The general rule is that the award is binding upon the parties and that it
cannot be appealed or otherwise challenged, except in the cases provided for
under the Convention. One of the consequences of this principle is that the
award will not be subject to judicial review by the national courts, as will hap-
pen in the case of the Additional Facility Rules.
For Mexico it is more advisable to ground the award interpretation, revision
and annulment motions, as well as award recognition and enforcement, in a
single statute, all wrapped up in a single package. All of these proceedings will
thus be deposited within the framework of an organized institutional system
with established and proven rules - a system that has gained experience, become
reliable, and staffed with highly qualified arbitrators well acquainted with ICSID
standards and international law.
Submitting motions for review of an award to a domestic court, as pre-
scribed in the Additional Facility rules, is risky. The local court might ignore or
be unaware of the peculiarities of arbitration, the precedents existing in the
ICSID and, still worse, be unfamiliar with an international legal system applica-
ble to foreign investment.
One of the critical goals of the ICSID system is to avoid confrontations be-
tween states by depoliticizing investment-related disputes. Under the ICSID
system, an investor can assume a certain dispute as his own without the state of
which he is a national being involved or having to grant diplomatic protection.
This reduces or removes potential frictions between states, by encapsulating the
nature of the conflict and putting some distance between the two involved states
so as not to damage the bilateral political relationship.
The Convention expressly forbids a contracting state from extending diplo-
matic protection to one of its investors or filing an international claim if the
dispute is subject to arbitration pursuant to the ICSID Convention. This prohibi-
tion is not provided for in the Additional Facility Rules, which would mean, in
an undesirable case, that it is possible to commence an arbitration proceeding
against Mexico. At the same time, the state of which the investor is a national
could also exert whatever action is available under the diplomatic protection
principle, with all of the inherent negative effects.
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Mexico is already bound by a good number of treaties that include an arbitra-
tion clause for the settlement of investment disputes. From a legal and political
point of view, it seems advisable for Mexico to advance one step further and
become a contracting party of ICSID, with the benefits and advantages that ac-
crue from this system of rules.
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